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Abstract: The analysis of the attitude of Italian citizens to social challenges – political and economic, 
assessed from the point of view of their own (non)religiousness, is the purpose of this study. Two meth-
ods were used during the study. The comparative one, which allows indicating the diversity of views of 
socio-religious groups, and the statistical one, including the quantitative and qualitative approach.
  The implementation of the chosen goal was based on the adoption of research hypotheses confirmed 
by the collected material. First of all: on many issues, the views of believers are consistent with the 
opinions of non-believers and distant in relation to the official position of the Church and hierarchy. 
Secondly, the views of people declaring themselves as believers differ, which proves that religion is 
not the primary reference for assessing changes within the political system. In the field of research, the 
change and collapse of the image of a culturally homogenous state can be noticed. The religious homo-
geneity of Italy does not confirm the growing number of people declaring themselves as non-believers 
and non-Catholic religionists. This is also not confirmed by the diversity within the group of Catholics 
who, in the assessment of social phenomena and political events, are inclined to follow non-religious 
reasons, mainly programs of right-wing parties, often populist and anti-system, which many Italian 
Catholics support.
Key words: religious determinants, religions in Italy, religion and the political system, Catholicism and 
social phenomena
Although political participation might take on religious functions, religion can also be an essential determinant of the impact on current politics, economic decisions or 
social processes. It performed this function in Italy, especially in relation to Catholicism, 
which is a dominating religion in this country. This role, mainly after the Second World 
War, changed along with the following periods resulting from broad social changes: 
the period of Catholic triumphalism (1945–1958), the new secularisation (1958–1978) 
and  religious pluralism  (after 1978)  (Pollard, 2008). Currently,  although  the majority 
of citizens of the Italian Republic declare their attachment to the Catholic religion, it is 
becoming more and more subjectively characterised. This becomes noticeable also in the 
context of current political events and social phenomena, whose assessment is heteroge-
neous and thus far from the official teaching of the Church.
The analysis of the attitude of Italian citizens towards social challenges – political 
and economic, assessed from the point of view of their own (non)religiousness, is the 
purpose of this study. Its implementation is based on the adopted research hypotheses, 
directly referring to the issues contained in the title. First of all, on many issues, the 
views of believers are consistent with the opinions of non-believers and distant in rela-
tion to the official position of the Church and hierarchy. Secondly: the views of people 
declaring themselves as believers differ, which proves that religion is not  the primary 
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reference for assessing changes within the political system. A change is visible in the 
field of research, which is the right impulse to deal with this matter. The gap between the 
image of a culturally homogenous state and its real condition becomes evident.
The study was based on a conceptual network, created by the following categories: 
religious determinants, religions in Italy, the importance of religion for the political sys-
tem and the influence of Catholics on social phenomena. Two methods have found their 
application. Firstly, the comparative method, which allows indicating the diversity of 
views of the socio-religious groups studied. Secondly, the statistical method, including 
the quantitative and qualitative approach.
Sociodemographic profile
The research carried out in December 2017 by Centro Studi sulle Nuove Religioni 
under the Le Religioni in Italia project shows that Christianity is the dominant religion 
in Italy. 77.3% of Italians declared it their religion (74.4% of the Catholic religion, 4.9% 
of the non-Catholic religion). 4.5% described themselves as followers of non-Christian 
religions, while the remaining 16.2% were non-believers, agnostics and atheists (Le re-
ligioni in Italia, 2018) (Chart 1).
Chart 1. Religious structure of the Italian population (%)
Catholics            Christians of other denominations            Non-Christians            Unaffiliated
16,2
74,4
4,5
4,9
Source: Database Pew Research Center.
However,  these  data  are  subject  to  continuous  fluctuations.  The  Pew  Research 
Center demonstrates this, the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which 
presents analyses of religious changes and their impact on societies around the world 
PP 1 ’19 Italian Catholicism in the Face of Contemporary Socio-political... 123
(The Pew-Templeton, 2009-). An essential part of the study are the growth numbers 
included in it: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–
2050. They show that in Italy, the decline in the number of believers over forty years 
will affect only Christians (–20%). In  the same period,  the number of Muslims will 
more than double (+150%), and slightly more – the number of people without any re-
ligion (+25%).1 Moreover, in the analysed period, the average age of religious people 
in Italy will increase by seven years (43–50). Slightly higher growth (by eight years) 
is forecast for people who do not identify themselves with any religion (40–48). The 
average age of Christians, the oldest religious group in the country (45–53) will also 
increase by eight years. Although the average age will also increase among Muslim 
believers (by four years), they will remain the youngest religious group (32-26) (The 
Pew-Templeton, 2009–).
These data provide an  introduction  to  the  appropriate  reflection on  the  attitude of 
Catholics –  the  largest  religious group  in  Italy –  to social  issues and current political 
challenges. These  issues were  devoted  to  a  report  prepared  by  IPSOS Public Affairs 
entitled I cattolicai tra presenza nel sociale e nuove domande alla politica (November 
2017) (I cattolici, 2017). By way of methodological precision, the authors have ranked 
the test sample according to specific criteria. With regard to three pieces of information 
(religious faith, participation in services, involvement in the activities of parishes or 
religious organisations), six groups (segments) were defined: 1) practitioners involved 
(I praticanti impegnati); 2) Assidous/participants less involved (Gli assidui/partecipanti 
scarsamente impegnati); 3) Occasional; 4) Non-practicing; 5) Non-believers; 6) Other 
Religions.2
Based on the proposed distinction, a sociodemographic profile has developed which 
indicates the stratification of the largest religious group in Italy (Table 1). Among the 
Catholics,  the majority are occasional practitioners (35.6%) – every  tenth one prac-
tices regularly and is involved in the local religious environment (11.2%). Noteworthy 
is the fact that the second largest and continuously growing group are non-believers 
(22.6%).
1  According to the Pew Research Center, the number of Christians in Italy will fall by 9,640,000 
over the period 2010–2050. The decline is also forecasted for the followers of Judaism (–20%). In 
turn, the number of followers of Islam will increase by 3,100,000. Other religious communities 
will also see an  increase: Hindus  (+230%), Buddhists  (+125%) and followers of natural  religions 
(+90%).
2  Each  group  has  been  precisely  defined.  1)  Participants  involved  (i praticanti impegnati): 
Catholics who participate in services every week and are involved in the activities of parishes or 
religious organisations; 2) Assiduous/participants less involved (gli assidui/partecipanti scarsa-
mente impegnati): Catholics who  attend weekly  services,  although  not  directly  involved  in  the 
activities of parishes or religious organisations, or participate once or twice a month in services, but 
maintain some activity in the parish or religious organisations; 3) Occasional (i salutari): Catholics 
who participate less than twice a month in services and are not involved in the activities of the 
parish or religious organisations; 4) Non-practicing (i non praticanti): they declare themselves as 
Catholics, but do not participate in services and are not involved in the activities of the parish or 
religious organisations; 5) Non-Believers (i non credenti): they declare themselves as having no 
religion; 6) Other Religions (credenti in altre religioini): they declare themselves as followers of 
other religions.
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Table 1
Sociodemographic profile of groups (%)
Commit-
ted Assiduous Occasional
Non-prac-
ticing
Non-be-
lievers
Other 
Religions
Total 11.2 15.8 35.6 11.8 22.6 3.0
Sex
Men 7.9 13.1 35.2 13.1 27.7 3.0
Women 14.1 18.2 36.2 10.7 18.0 2.8
Age
18–24 8.1 8.2 29.8 10.4 40.1 3.4
25–34 6.4 9.6 33.8 14.8 31.7 3.7
35–44 10.3 12.5 36.9 10.7 25.4 4.2
45–54 10.7 15.6 38.1 11.8 20.3 3.5
55–64 12.1 16.8 38.0 11.8 18.9 2.4
> 65 15.5 23.2 34.0 11.1 14.4 1.8
Qualification
University 12.9 15.5 29.7 9.4 30.0 2.5
Secondary 10.9 14.6 36.1 10.9 24.6 2.9
Middle 10.1 14.1 37.7 13.1 21.9 3.1
Elementary, none 12.7 21.4 34.8 12.5 15.3 3.3
Profession
Entrepreneurs 8.6 14.5 32.1 11.9 30.2 2.7
Independents 10.4 15.9 35.8 11.9 22.9 3.1
Officials, teachers 10.3 13.6 35.8 10.8 26.6 2.9
Workers and similar 7.0 9.6 37.2 14.4 27.0 4.8
Unemployed 8.9 10.7 37.8 13.9 24.6 4.1
Students 10.0 10.8 31.0 11.5 35.3 1.4
Housewives 15.6 21.4 40.9 9.1 10.6 2.4
Retirees 15.4 23.5 32.8 11.8 14.7 1.8
Geopolitical areas
North-west 9.4 16.0 33.4 13.1 24.6 3.5
Triveneto 10.5 15.2 36.2 9.9 25.5 2.7
Red Regions 8.8 12.9 31.7 14.6 28.8 3.2
South Centre 13.1 15.8 37.1 11.5 19.6 2.9
South and Islands 13.5 17.8 39.2 9.8 17.1 2.6
Wideness of the centres
< 10,000 12.0 17.1 35.5 11.4 21.5 2.5
10,000–30,000 10.6 15.8 37.9 11.3 21.2 3.2
30,000–100,000 12.1 16.6 34.7 11.9 21.6 3.1
> 100,000 9.8 13.1 34.3 12.9 26.3 3.6
Political autocollocation
Left 5.7 9.2 29.8 12.8 39.0 3.5
Centre Left 11.2 16.8 35.9 11.5 22.8 1.8
Centre 18.0 20.6 35.6 9.6 14.3 1.9
Centre Right 13.1 18.5 40.3 10.9 14.6 2.6
Right 10.7 14.2 38.8 15.1 18.6 2.6
Not placed 9.7 15.0 33.5 12.0 25.1 4.7
Source: Database IPSOS.
The analysis of the level of religiousness proves that the majority of men declared oc-
casional participation in religious practices or unbelief, while women declared irregular 
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attendance at services. Regular practices were mainly characterised by people over 55 
and occasional – in the range of 45–54 years. The largest group among non-practitioners 
are people aged 25–34. Primarily young people up  to  the age of 24 were declared as 
the non-denominational ones. Among the practitioners, the majority had the elementary 
education, while the highest percentage of people declaring regular participation in re-
ligious practices and religious involvement were people with higher education (12.9%). 
At the same time, however, the highest percentage of people who declared themselves 
as non-believers came from the same segment. In turn, the analysis considering profes-
sional qualifications showed that among the people who practiced the highest percentage 
were housewives and pensioners, the lowest – workers and the unemployed. Attention is 
drawn to the low involvement of students. It is also a group among which most people 
declared themselves as non-believers. Religious diversity also has its specific regions. 
Most of the practitioners lived in the southern, mid-southern and island areas,3 the least 
– the so-called red regions.4 Among the inhabitants of these regions and Triveneto,5 the 
most significant number of people with an atheistic or agnostic worldview lived. Prac-
ticing and religiously involved people constituted the largest percentage of the popu-
lation of both small (up to 30,000) and medium (30,000–100,000) cities. From cities 
over 100,000, the largest group of inhabitants declared themselves as non-believers; it 
was also there where the highest percentage of people professing a religion other than 
Catholic lived. The last component of the socio-political profile research were political 
preferences among people with a certain  level of  religious commitment. Most practi-
tioners sympathised with views described as centre or centre-right; the left-handed the 
lowest support in this group. On the other hand, among the non-practicing people were 
right-wing political sympathies. The Left’s greatest support was enjoyed by people who 
do not identify with any religion.
The mentioned preferences were reflected in the analysis of support for parties and 
political movements (Table 2).
Table 2
Voting intentions (%)6
Total Committed Assiduous Occasional Non- practicing
Non-
believers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
M5s 18.4 16.5 14.1 19.6 16.7 21.1
PD 16.3 19.6 19.5 15.1 15.6 16.2
FI 10.6 13.1 12.7 12.6 8.4 6.3
3  Of the 800 Italian islands, 80 are inhabited. The two largest – Sardinia and Sicily – form a sepa-
rate area, the so-called Island Italy (Italia insulare or Isole). Each of them is a separate administrative 
region with a special status.
4 In this way homogeneity of electoral preferences of the inhabitants of four regions was deter-
mined: Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria and Marche.
5 It is a historical land, created today by three regions: Venezia Euganea, Venezia Giulia and Vene-
zia Tridentina.
6 Movimento 5 stelle (M5s, The Five Star Movement); Partito Democratico (PD, The Democratic 
Party); Forza Italia (FI, Northem League); Fratelli d’Italia (FdI; Brothers of Italy); Sinistra Italiana 
(SI, Italian Left); Articolo 1 – Movimento Democratico e Progressista (MDP, Article 1 – Democratic 
and Progressive Movement); Alternativa Popolare (AP, Popular Alternative).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LN 9.8 7.0 7.8 11.1 14.2 8.5
FdI 3.3 2.5 4.5 3.8 3.8 2.0
SI + MDP 3.1 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.7 5.8
AP + other center lists 2.2 5.2 4.4 1.9 1.0 1.0
Other 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.7
No vote: absence, no indication 34.9 31.9 33.8 32.7 36.6 37.4
Source: Database IPSOS.
The presented data show that the Populist Movement of the Five Stars Beppe Grillo 
had the largest group of its supporters among non-believers, while the lowest among 
sporadically practicing. The centre-right Democratic Party, managed by Matteo Renzi 
during the period of the study, enjoyed the highest support among Catholics who prac-
tice irregularly. The group created by Silvio Berlusconi Forza Italia was primarily sup-
ported by engaged Catholics, as opposed to non-believers. The right-wing and populist 
Northern League enjoyed  the most  significant  support  among non-practitioners,  the 
smallest among the Catholics involved. In turn, the national-conservative group Ital-
ian Brothers, led by Giorgia Maleoni, found a large group of allies among Catholics 
who do not show religious commitment, while little support from those who declare 
themselves as non-believers. The joint list of the Italian Left and the Democratic and 
Progressive Movement led by Nicola Fratoianni and Roberto Speranza was the most 
popular among those who did not profess any religion. The new centre-right Group 
Alternative Party, whose  head was  elected Angelino Alfano,  owed  its  little  support 
mainly to people regularly participating in services. However, the largest group were 
those who did not vote or were not identifying themselves with any of the political 
forces of the current party system. In each of the presented segments, the percentage 
exceeded 30%.
Socio-economic issues
Another of the thematic blocks of the research conducted by IPSOS were issues re-
lated to the economic and political situation of the country. First of all, reference was 
made to the economic crisis, the current economic situation and its impact on the condi-
tion of households (Table 3).
The majority  of  the  respondents  negatively  assessed  the  direction  in which  the 
state was heading (67%); only 19% considered it appropriate – the remaining 14% did 
not have an opinion on this subject. Among the fiercest critics were non-practitioners, 
non-believers and dissenters. On average, every fifth committed Catholic expressed 
moderate appreciation. Equally critical results described the economic condition of 
the country, which was negatively assessed by over 80% of respondents (the highest 
proportion were non-believers and irregular practitioners), with 22% of positive opin-
ions (mainly non-Catholics). As for the expected changes in the economic situation 
in the near future, half of the respondents believed that it would remain unchanged 
(the dominant percentage was irregularly practicing). The hope for improvement was 
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expressed mainly by practicing Catholics, while the fear of  the deterioration of  the 
economic situation was betrayed mostly by non-believers. A very high percentage of 
people in Italian society was concerned about the economic crisis (75%). The most 
worried were people who were occasional practitioners or not practicing at all. By 
specifying a consistory relative to the «moment» of the crisis, the most numerous 
groups convinced that the “worst was over” were people who were religiously in-
volved. The strong polarisation within this group is evidenced by the fact that a slight-
ly higher percentage of people claimed that “the worst is yet to come.” Among the 
people willing to describe the situation at the time as the “top of the crisis” were 
mainly non-practicing.
Table 3
Catholics and economic climate (%)
Total 
cases
Com-
mitted
Assid-
uous
Occa-
sional
Non-
practicing
Non-be-
lievers
Other 
Religions
Evaluation of the progress of the country
It’s going in the right direction 19 24 23 17 20 16 14
It’s going in the wrong direction 67 63 58 65 70 70 71
Unknown 14 13 19 18 10 14 15
Assessment of the state of the country’s economy
Very positive 2 3 2 2 1 1 9
Quite positive 20 23 28 19 18 17 12
Quite negative 47 39 45 53 50 42 57
Very negative 27 30 21 23 27 35 16
Unknown 4 5 4 3 4 5 6
Expectations about the evolution of their family economic situation in the immediate future
Expects an improvement 23 36 24 22 25 19 21
Remain unchanged 50 43 47 54 46 50 50
Expects a deterioration 23 18 25 21 23 25 23
Unknown 4 3 4 3 6 6 6
Level of concern about the economic crisis
Very worried (8–10) 45 47 37 48 55 42 39
Enough (6–7) 30 31 33 32 22 29 29
Little (4–5) 17 13 20 14 16 21 19
Unconcerned (1–3) 6 5 8 5 6 5 11
Unknown 2 4 2 1 1 3 2
The indication of the perceived “momentum” of the economic crisis
The worst is over 27 35 32 24 24 26 32
We are now at the height of the 
crisis
29 19 27 31 34 29 19
The worst is yet to come 34 39 31 36 34 33 34
Unknown 10 7 10 9 8 12 15
Source: Database IPSOS.
In the next stage of the research, issues related to the most important civic issues were 
addressed, both at the national and local levels (Table 4).
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Table 4
Catholics and issues (%)
Total  
cases
Com-
mitted
Assid-
uous
Occa-
sional
Non-
practicing
Non-be-
lievers
Other  
Religions
The agenda of citizens’ priorities at national level (three possible spontaneous answers – grouping 
by thematic area)
Work and employment 80 84 81 81 81 79 65
Bad functioning of the institutions 38 33 31 34 40 45 57
Immigration 34 25 32 38 37 29 51
Welfare and assistance 28 35 31 32 21 25 15
Safety 24 23 24 27 23 20 29
Environment and territory 5 5 7 5 3 4 4
Mobility 2 4 2 2 1 2 1
The agenda of citizens’ priorities at the local level (three possible spontaneous answers – grouping 
by thematic area)
Work and employment 49 51 49 52 46 49 28
Mobility 30 38 33 30 25 30 25
Safety 23 21 28 21 19 22 43
Environment and territory 23 17 23 25 23 23 16
Welfare and assistance 18 20 16 20 17 15 28
Bad functioning of the institutions 18 16 12 17 24 19 25
Immigration 16 6 22 17 14 16 19
Source: Database IPSOS.
With regard to the national level, all groups considered work and employment the 
most important (80%), and the least important – mobility (2%). Non-Catholic denomi-
nations indicated the poor functioning of the institution as one of the priorities; they 
also emphasised the  importance of  the migration issue. Care and support have been 
especially crucial for those who regularly participate in services, and for the safety 
of dissenters. At an even low level, the representatives of all groups were ready to 
recognise the environment and territory as well as the mobility as mentioned above as 
a matter of priority.
The priorities agenda at  the  local  level  is  slightly different. Although employment 
and employment were also considered the most important issue, with a lower percentage 
of respondents (49%), immigration was considered the least important (16%). Mobility 
was a serious issue mainly for those who were religiously involved, while for the believ-
ers of other religions – security. In turn, non-practitioners pointed to the importance of 
the environment and territory, while non-Catholics saw the value of care and support. 
Non-believers paid attention to the issue of the malfunctioning of institutions, whereas 
non-practitioners – to the migration crisis.
Due to religious preferences, the quality of life in the area of their residence was also 
assessed7 (Table 5). Over a half of the respondents rated it positively (59%), while the 
minority (39%) was negative.
7 The weekly “The Economist” developed the «Life-where-to-be Index». Independent variables 
define it: material well-being as measured, life expectancy at birth, climate, personal security, quality 
of life, governance, gender equality (Wile, 2013).
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Table 5
Catholics and quality of life (%)
Total  
cases
Commit-
ted
Assidu-
ous
Occa-
sional
Non- 
practicing
Non- 
believers
Other  
Religions
Assessment of the quality of life in your area of residence
Very positive 17 22 16 16 16 18 11
Quite positive 42 34 39 44 43 44 36
Quite negative 23 25 30 20 24 19 47
Very negative 16 16 11 19 15 17 6
Unknown 2 3 4 1 1 2 0
Quality of life trend compared to the past
Improved 10 18 10 9 9 9 5
Remained unchanged 41 37 39 37 40 45 64
Worsened 48 45 50 53 49 45 31
Unknown 1 0 1 1 2 1 0
Source: Database IPSOS.
Among those who positively assess the quality of life, there are the most regular 
practitioners and non-believers. The non-Catholic religion sees the quality of life nega-
tively.
In comparison to the past, almost half of the respondents indicate a deterioration in 
the quality of life (48%), a little less of them see less significant changes (41%). Every 
tenth  respondent  notices  a  significant  improvement  (the  highest  percentage  are  those 
who regularly participate in services). Mainly the believers of other religions described 
the situation as “remained unchanged.” On the other hand, the deterioration of living 
conditions was emphasised above all by those who believed but were not involved in the 
activities of religious organisations.
The last issue in this part was the question about the attitude of Catholics to the activi-
ties of central and local administration bodies (regional and municipal) (Table 6).
Table 6
Catholics and the work of central and peripheral administrations (%)
Total cases Committed Assiduous Occasional Non- practicing
Non- 
believers
Other  
Religions
Appreciation for the work of the Government
42 43 58 42 47 32 35
Appreciation for the work of the Prime Minister
43 44 59 42 46 35 29
Appreciation for the work of own regional administration
43 48 46 40 42 46 20
Appreciation for the work of own municipal administration
46 47 45 47 45 47 26
Source: Database IPSOS.
The actual appreciation for the work of the indicated institutions was expressed by 
a little more than 40%. Among the ones positively evaluating the activities of the govern-
ment and its head, the highest percentage were irregularly practicing and active in reli-
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gious groups. The lowest ratings for the government were received from non-believers 
and the Prime Minister from non-Catholic denominations. Regional administration en-
joyed the highest recognition among both believers and non-believers, while the smallest 
one among non-Catholics. They were also the most critical group in relation to the mu-
nicipal administration; in turn, religious (Catholics) and non-religious people expressed 
appreciation for the work of organs of this level.
Current social challenges
In the last part of the IPSOS report, the views of believers on current social and politi-
cal issues have been examined. The legalisation of same-sex relationships, the migration 
crisis, changes in the right to grant citizenship, the European referendum and the phe-
nomenon of populism were recognised as such (Table 7).
Table 7
Catholics and civil unions (%)
Total 
cases Committed Assiduous Occasional
Non-prac-
ticing
Non-
believers
Other 
Religions
The Parliament approved the civil unions’ law by a vote of confidence. As far as you could under-
stand, do you approve or disapprove of the new rules adopted?
Approval 37 27 31 41 38 44 29
Disapproval 41 55 50 35 36 34 58
Unknown 22 18 19 24 26 22 13
After the approval of the law on civil unions, some believe that the rules relating to adoptions must 
be modified, which are currently allowed in Italy only for couples that are married. In your opinion, 
are these rules as good as they are, or should they be extended to allow more people to adopt? (If 
extended, possible multiple answers)
They are fine as they are now.
46 55 47 53 48 28 40
They should also be extended to heterosexual de facto couples
37 29 30 31 40 55 37
Should also be extended to singles
27 12 27 22 33 38 38
They should also be extended to homosexual couples
24  9 22 22 29 36 13
Unknown
13 18 19 10  9 13 14
Source: Database IPSOS.
On 5 June 2016, the law regulating civil relationships of persons of the same sex and 
cohabitation (the so-called legge Cirinnà)8 entered into force. By introducing a distinc-
tion between them, the act refuses same-sex relationships to adopt children (Regolamen-
tazione, 2016). The ratio of respondents to the adopted law was shared by almost half 
of  Italian  society:  supporters  (37%) and opponents  (41%). Among  the first,  the high-
8  The term comes from the name of Monika Cirinnà, senator of the Democratic Party, promoter of 
legislative changes in the described area.
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est percentage were non-believers, while among the second – regular practitioners and 
non-Catholics. A significant group did not take an unambiguous position in this sphere 
(22%).
The next study concerned the extension of the right of adoption to subsequent per-
sons, which in Italy is currently only allowed for couples who are married. Almost a half 
declared the law in force to be non-changeable (46%). Somewhat less favoured the ex-
tradition of extramarital heterosexual relationships (37%). On average, every fourth re-
spondent considered it appropriate to grant the right to adoption to single people (27%) 
and homosexual couples (24%). While in the first case the highest percentage were prac-
ticing Catholics, in the remaining three they were non-believers.
The issue, which strongly polarised the political scene and, consequently, also the 
social mood, was a migration crisis (Dudała, 2018a). This was also reflected in the posi-
tion adopted by the socio-religious groups under study (Table 8).
Table 8
Catholics and immigration (%)
Total cases Commit-ted Assiduous Occasional
Non-prac-
ticing
Non-
believers
Other 
Religions
Immigrants are a threat to our culture and our traditions and are not necessary for our future
32 29 30 36 39 28 23
Immigrants are a threat, but they are necessary for our future
22 16 21 23 26 20 25
Immigrants are not a threat, but they are not necessary for our future
22 26 23 21 19 20 29
Immigrants are not a threat to our culture and are necessary for our future to prevent Italy from 
a rapidly declining population and resources
23 28 26 20 16 27 21
No definite opinion
 1  1  0  0  0   5  2
Source: Database IPSOS.
By submitting the views of the respondents to the overall assessment, four propos-
als for positions were formulated. According to the highest percentage of people (32%), 
immigrants pose a threat to native culture and tradition, and their presence is not neces-
sary for the future of the country. Slightly fewer (22%) claim that immigrants’ presence, 
although they are a threat, is necessary to prevent a rapid decline in population and re-
sources in Italy. The same number of respondents claim that foreigners, although they do 
not constitute a threat, however, their presence is not necessary due to the future of the 
country. Almost as many respondents (23%) think that immigrants do not pose a threat 
to Italian culture and tradition, and their presence is necessary for the face of future chal-
lenges.
The group that displayed the greatest reluctance towards incoming immigrants were 
non-practicing or practicing occasionally. On the other hand, practitioners and non-be-
lievers did not perceive the threat in their presence, seeing in it also a legitimate interest 
for the future of the country.
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Another of the questions also covered the migration crisis, and concerned non-gov-
ernmental  organisations  dealing with  the  rescue  of  immigrants  in  the Mediterranean 
(Table 9).
Table 9
Catholics and NGO (%)
Total 
cases
Commit-
ted
Assidu-
ous
Occa-
sional
Non-
practic-
ing
Non-be-
lievers
Other 
Religions
“I will now read to you some statements concerning non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
deal with rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. For each of them tell me if they share it  
or not.”
“The work of humanitarian organisations helps save lives because the authorities alone would  
not make it.”
Shares it (votes 6–10) 55 60 66 47 54 59 52
Not shares it (votes 1–5) 27 25 20 35 25 22 27
Unknown 18 15 14 18 21 19 21
“All humanitarian organisations have an economic interest in saving migrants.”
Shares it (votes 6–10) 60 45 60 67 59 54 78
Not shares it (votes 1–5) 24 35 27 19 24 27 15
Unknown 16 20 13 14 17 19  7
“Some humanitarian organisations are certainly in agreement with traffickers.”
Shares it (votes 6–10) 63 56 62 69 64 56 67
Not shares it (votes 1–5) 22 31 25 18 21 25 15
Unknown 15 13 13 13 15 19 18
Source: Database IPSOS.
Over half of the respondents (55%) shared the opinion that the activity of humanitar-
ian organisations helps to save lives and is necessary because state authorities are unable 
to remedy this alone. Every fourth person (27%) was of the opposite opinion. Another 
opinion suggests that all humanitarian organisations saving migrants are guided only by 
economic interest. 60% of respondents share it and rejects 24%. The last of these opin-
ions suggests that humanitarian organisations act in cooperation with smugglers. 63% of 
respondents supported this opinion, 22% questioned it.
Among those who appreciate the activities of non-governmental organisations sup-
porting the state in the face of the migration crisis, the highest percentage were Catholics 
engaged in their communities; the most restrained with the above were non-practicing. 
For only mercantile motives in rescuing immigrants, organisations were mainly accused 
by people professing religions other than Catholicism; A critical stance in this matter was 
presented mainly by committed practicing Catholics. Accusations of cooperation with 
smugglers towards non-governmental organisations were primarily directed by practic-
ing Catholics and non-Catholic denominations; this view was rejected, though not un-
equivocally, by those who were religiously involved.
The area of the next study directly referred to the debate on granting Italian citizen-
ship to young immigrants (Ius soli, Ius culturae). Well, during the legislative process 
there is still a draft bill that grants citizenship to foreigners according to the principles of 
ius soli and ius cultarae (Modifiche). Concerning the proposed changes, two questions 
were raised as part of the research (Table 10).
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Table 10
Catholics and ius soli/ius culturae
Total 
cases
Com-
mitted
Assidu-
ous
Occa-
sional
Non-
practicing
Non-be-
lievers
Other 
Religions
“In general, how much would you agree to extend Italian citizenship to the children of foreign immi-
grants born in our country, with at least one parent having a permanent residence permit in Italy?”
Agree (votes 6–10) 47 54 45 43 48 48 57
Disagreement (votes 1–5) 49 35 50 54 48 49 35
Unknown  4 11   5  3  4  3   8
“But how much would it agree to grant Italian citizenship to foreign children or young people who 
were born in Italy or arrived there within 12 years and who demonstrate that they have regularly 
attended schools in our country for at least five years?”
Agree (votes 6–10) 54 61 52 54 52 57 37
Disagreement (votes 1–5) 43 30 44 46 46 40 57
Unknown  3  9  2  2  2  3  6
Source: Database IPSOS.
The first question referred to the principle of ius soli and concerned the approval of 
the right to grant Italian citizenship to children of immigrants born in Italy, of whom at 
least one has a permanent residence permit in the country. The attitude to the question 
formulated in this way divided the respondents into two identical groups: supporters 
(47%) and opponents  (49%). The most  significant percentage of  the first  group were 
non-Catholic religions, in the second case they were mainly “summer” Catholics.
The second question referred to the principle of ius culturae granting Italian citizen-
ship to children of foreigners who were born in Italy or arrived here before the age of 12 
and regularly attended an Italian school for at least five years. Most of the respondents 
expressed their willingness to recognise the above law (54%) – the opposition expressed 
less than half (43%). The attitude of approval was characterised to a large extent by those 
who were religiously involved, and representatives of non-Catholic denominations de-
manded the rejection of new records.
Another of the topics present in the public discourse, especially in the context of the 
statements of the politicians of the present coalition government, was the attitude towards 
the European Union, of which Italy remains one of the six founding countries. Three is-
sues, formulated in the form of hypotheses, were considered crucial. (Table 11).
Table 11
Catholics and Europe
Total 
cases
Commit-
ted
Assidu-
ous
Occa-
sional
Non-
practicing
Non-
believers
Other 
Religions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
How much confidence do you have in the European Union?
Positive votes (6–10) 36 50 41 34 33 34 16
Negative votes (1–5) 59 48 52 62 64 60 56
Unknown   5  2  7  3  4  6 19
If a Euro referendum is held in Italy, you would vote…
To exit 33 31 31 35 35 32 25
To stay 41 43 48 40 38 40 33
Unknown 26 26 21 25 27 28 42
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
If in Italy a referendum was held to go out or to stay in the European Union, you would vote…
To exit 25 19 21 28 28 26 26
To stay 49 63 58 42 50 48 27
Unknown 26 18 19 30 22 26 47
Source: Database IPSOS.
When  asked  about  trust  in  the  EU  institutions,  the  vast majority  gave  a  negative 
answer (59%), with a minority of positive votes (36%). Answers to the other two ques-
tions turned out to be more conducive to pro-European sympathies. With regard to the 
forecast referendum on the eurozone, 41% were in favour of staying, 33% for the exit. 
Also, in the matter of a possible vote on the further membership of Italy in the Union, 
almost half were in favour of staying (49%), and every fourth respondent expected an 
exit (25%). In both cases, a large number of respondents could not take an unequivocal 
position (26%).
The group expressing the greatest confidence in the European Union were practicing 
and committed Catholics – in contrast  to non-believers and non-practitioners. In turn, 
I prefer to stay in the Euroregion as well as in the structures of the European Union; they 
were expressed primarily by religiously committed Catholics; non-believers and non-
practitioners mainly made the opposite opinion.
The last phenomenon assessed due to religious commitment was the wave of popu-
lism growing in Europe (Dudała, 2018b). It resulted in far-reaching changes in electoral 
preferences and the transition of power in many countries, including Italy.9 In the course 
of the research, this phenomenon was referred to the party system, legitimisation of 
power, European Union competences, migration crisis and globalisation, thus creating 
the so-called Populism Index (Table 12).
Table 12
Catholics and populism
Total cases Committed Assiduous Occasional Non- practicing
Non- 
believers
Other  
Religions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
According to you, the populist movements that are emerging in different European countries are…
A threat to democracy (%)
29 34 44 26 25 24 25
Parties like others (%)
18 25 19 18 10 18 25
Parties that interpret the needs of the people better than others (%)
31 29 25 29 42 36 13
Unknown (%)
22 12 12 27 23 22 37
Index of agreement with some statements [scale from 0 (for nothing) to 100 (completely)]
“The Italian ruling class does not understand the needs and problems of citizens like me”
85 89 77 84 90 86 91
9  The most  spectacular example was  the  result of  the parliamentary elections  in  Italy  (4 March 
2018), which resulted in the formation of a government of two populist groups – the Five Star Move-
ment and the Northern League, headed by Giuseppe Conte.
PP 1 ’19 Italian Catholicism in the Face of Contemporary Socio-political... 135
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
“Italian interests are not taken into consideration by the European Union”
77 70 78 79 83 75 58
“Citizens, not politicians, should make the most important political decisions for Italy”
67 65 63 68 71 66 60
“Immigration is a threat to national identity”
59 50 60 62 65 56 47
“Globalization is a threat to my economic condition”
57 48 60 61 60 52 50
Populism Index Scale from 0 (no adhesion to populism) to 100 (total adhesion)
58.5 54.6 55.8 59.2 65.1 58.5 47.6
Source: Database IPSOS.
The largest percentage of respondents perceived populist movements as groups 
that understand the needs of people much better than others (31%); Non-practitioners 
and non-believers marked significant participation  in  this belief. Fewer  respondents 
saw a threat to the functioning of the democratic order in the activities of these parties 
(29%); this concern was expressed mainly by engaged Catholics. Almost every fifth 
respondent rated populist parties as equal groups to the others on the political scene 
(18%);  this  opinion was  supported, with  little  support,  by Catholics  and  people  of 
other religions.
At the next stage (on a scale of 0–100), the ratio to expressions characteristic of popu-
list rhetoric was examined. The first of them indicated that the Italian ruling class did 
not understand the needs and problems of ordinary citizens. With very high general ap-
proval, the largest percentage were non-Catholic faiths. Another opinion suggested that 
Italian interests are not taken into account by the European Union. To the greatest extent, 
non-practicing people were in favour of this evaluation, in the smallest one – non-practi-
tioners. The third of the statements suggested that the most important political decisions 
regarding Italy should be made not by politicians but by citizens. The supporters of 
this solution were mainly non-practitioners and occasional practitioners. The same two 
groups confirm the fears of national identity in the light of the incoming immigrants. The 
last expression concerned globalisation and accompanying threats directly affecting the 
economic situation of the respondents. The practitioners and non-practitioners were the 
ones who liked the opinion the most.
The final result of the study was indexation, which allowed to determine the ratio of 
individual groups to the phenomenon of populism. At a hundred-point scale, the aver-
age for all six segments was 58.5. The most vulnerable populist rhetoric turned out to 
be a group of non-practicing (65.1). An equally high degree of approval for  this  type 
of views was presented by people who sporadically practiced (59.2) and non-believers 
(58.5). In two subsequent groups, the index was slightly below average – among those 
who regularly practice and are involved in the activities of religious organisations (54.6) 
and among Catholics characterised by one of these features (55.8). The lowest level of 
susceptibility to the influence of populist rhetoric was characteristic of people of religion 
other than Catholic (47.6).
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Conclusions
A number of studies and published analyses seem to confirm that religion still has a strong 
influence on the global economy, politics and other areas of life (Micklethwait, Wooldridge, 
2009). Hence the thesis of the influential thinkers of the nineteenth century about the loss 
of the meaning of religion with the advent of industrial society were legitimately subjected 
to critical analysis (Norris, Inglehart, 2005). Although this does not mean an increase in the 
number of «nominal» members of traditional communities or organisations, and institution-
ally-oriented religion seems to remain on the margins of modern society, its significance 
remains very important. This confirms Thomas Luckmann’s thesis about the «invisible reli-
gion» and the transformation of religion into religiousness (Luckmann, 1967).
This regularity can also be noticed in the Italian society examined for their religious-
ness, which is confirmed by the attempt of analysis. The image of Catholicism, the largest 
religious group in the country, is very diverse in the opinions of believers. For the most 
part, it is represented by middle-aged women living in the mid-southern regions with an 
average level of education. The analysis shows the fragmentation of the position regarding 
issues regarding the assessment of political events and electoral preferences, which proves 
the validity of the first hypothesis. Thus, in many matters, the views of believers are consis-
tent with the opinions of non-believers and distant in relation to the official position of the 
Church and hierarchy. The low turnout in practice causes that the subjectification of doc-
trinal indications, their selective recognition or total negation, is becoming more and more 
frequent. While the ratio of the official teaching of the Church to the law governing civil 
unions remains invariably negative, considerable acceptance is seen among lay members 
of the community. Another example of a similar «disintegration» is the migration crisis. 
The approving position of the institution and the encouragement of openness towards refu-
gees «collided» with the reluctance and exclusion presented by a significant percentage of 
Catholics. Thus, according to the second hypothesis, the views of people declaring them-
selves as believers differ, which proves that religion is not the primary reference for as-
sessing changes within the political system. The image of a culturally homogenous state is 
broken, in which the social link has so far been religion. The homogeneous Catholic char-
acter of Italy, recalled in the literature, requires verification. The growing number of people 
declaring themselves as non-believers and non-Catholic religionists does not confirm the 
homogeneous specifics. This is also not confirmed by the diversity within the Catholics 
themselves who, in assessing social phenomena and political events, are inclined to follow 
nonreligious reasons contrary to official teaching. Such is the program of right-wing par-
ties, often populist and anti-system, which a large part of Italian Catholics gives their sup-
port. All this makes it necessary to define the ratio of Italian Catholicism to contemporary 
challenges as heterogeneous and requiring further observation and in-depth analysis.
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Włoski katolicyzm w obliczu współczesnych wyzwań społeczno-politycznych.  
Próba analizy 
 
Streszczenie
Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza stosunku obywateli włoskich do wyzwań społecznych – poli-
tycznych i ekonomicznych, ocenianych z punktu widzenia własnej (nie) religijności. W toku prowadzo-
nych badań zastosowano dwie metody: porównawczą, który pozwala wykazać różnorodność poglądów 
grup społeczno-religijnych, a także statystyczną, zakładającą podejście ilościowe i jakościowe.
Realizacja wskazanego celu została oparta na przyjęciu hipotez badawczych potwierdzonych na-
stępnie przez zgromadzony materiał. Po pierwsze, w wielu kwestiach poglądy wierzących są zgodne 
z opiniami niewierzących a odległe w stosunku do oficjalnego stanowiska Kościoła. Po drugie, po-
glądy ludzi deklarujących się jako wierzący różnią się, co dowodzi, że religia nie jest podstawowym 
punktem odniesienia dla oceny zmian systemu politycznego. Można przy tym zauważyć odejście od 
obrazu  jednorodnego kulturowo. Przywoływana  religijna homogeniczność włoskiego społeczeństwa 
stoi w opozycji do rosnącej liczby osób deklarujących się jako niewierzący bądź jako wyznawcy religii 
niekatolickich. Nie potwierdza  tego również wewnętrzne zróżnicowanie w grupie katolików, którzy 
w ocenie zjawisk społecznych i wydarzeń politycznych skłonni są podążać za względami niereligijny-
mi, głównie programami partii prawicowych, często populistycznych i antysystemowych.
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i zjawiska społeczne
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